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How Our Life Experiences Affect Our Politics: The Roles  
of Vested Interest and Affect in Shaping Policy Preferences 
Gregory A. Petrow and Timothy Vercellotti 
Scholars investigating the role of self-interest in determining policy preferences find that self-
interest has weak effects. However, researchers have refined their concepts of self-interest and are 
now finding a greater role for it (e.g., Crano 1995). We continue along this line of research, con-
sidering different mechanisms by which self-interest may come to be important. We argue that 
measuring people’s perceived self-interest in a policy (which we call vested interest) is important for 
understanding how people pursue their self-interest. We find that while life circumstances can cause
people to endorse vested interest, emotion is an important mediator of this relationship. Finally, we
test the notion that value change mediates between vested interest and support for a policy, and find
evidence for a reciprocal relationship. 
If asked in casual conversation, most scholars knowledgeable about
political behavior would downplay the connection between individuals’ life 
events and their politics. In all likelihood, however, that conclusion would
probably be met with skepticism by the other conversation participants. In-
deed, the simple and intuitive relationship between people’s experiences, 
self interest, and their politics forms the bedrock of democratic theory (e.g., 
Hamilton et al. 1961). Much of the relevant literature, however, concludes
there is no relationship between self-interest and policy preferences. Instead,
scholars usually find that symbolic attitudes, such as political ideology, have 
the most consistent and powerful effects (see Sears and Funk 1991 for a 
review).1 
There is a developing literature, however, that is exploring the link 
between self-interest and policy attitudes (e.g., Crano 1995). This paper
advances that literature and takes a step toward explaining how the events
that befall people affect their political attitudes. While the effects of these 
events on policy preferences might operate through a variety of mechanisms, 
we argue that people’s perceived self-interest (which we and other scholars 
label “vested interest”) is an important factor to consider. In other words, we
propose a model of how events in people’s lives cause them to believe that 
certain public policies are in their self-interest, thus increasing support for
Data upon which this research is based are from the Elon University Poll, Elon University Institute
of Politics and Public Affairs, Elon, NC, April 2005. 
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4 | Gregory A. Petrow and Timothy Vercellotti 
those policies. We call those life-changing events the antecedents of self-
interest. 
We refer to two literatures in building our theory. First, we consider the
symbolic politics literature. Scholars in this literature demonstrate the 
powerful and consistent relationship between people’s symbolic predisposi-
tions and policy preferences, while at the same time emphasizing the weak 
relationship between people’s life circumstances (as manifested by their self-
interest) and their policy preferences.2 Second, the vested interest literature 
attempts to buttress the modest role allowed for life events by explaining
that when people perceive that certain public policies are in their self-
interest, they support those policies (e.g., Crano 1995). The crucial differ-
ence between the two literatures is in conceptualizing, and then measuring, 
self-interest. 
In the symbolic politics research, scholars assume that certain circum-
stances ought to routinely produce self-interest. For example, someone lack-
ing health insurance should support a national health care program, or 
someone whose child is bused across town should oppose school busing to 
desegregate schools. In the vested interest literature, however, self-interest is
seen as a psychological process that varies between individuals. The vested
interest literature explores how antecedents of self-interest lead some people 
to perceive that certain policies are in their self-interest, thus increasing 
support for the policy.3 
In addition, we introduce a provocative hypothesis—that when people 
believe they will benefit from a certain policy, that belief causes individuals 
to change their political values in a way that is consistent with support for
the policy. We further expect that emotion will mediate the relationships
between the antecedents of self-interest and their vested interest, as well as 
the antecedents of self-interest and policy preferences. 
In this paper we develop a model that incorporates the antecedents of 
self-interest, vested interest, political values, and emotion as predictors of 
preferences for public policy. We test the model using a specific policy—a 
government-backed national health insurance program. We chose national
health insurance because health care costs constitute a growing proportion of
household expenditures, and the percentage of the adult, non-elderly popula-
tion in the United States that lacks health insurance has risen steadily in
recent years (Holahan and Cook 2005). 
This paper seeks to advance the literature in three important ways. 
First, we consider the mechanism by which people’s changing life circum-
stances—which we term antecedents of self-interest—might affect a policy 
preference. We, like others, expect them to affect vested interest (e.g.,
Boninger et al. 1995). In turn, we expect that the effect of vested interest can 
be mediated by a change in an important symbolic predisposition—the
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
      
How Our Life Experiences Affect Our Politics  | 5 
political value that is associated in citizens’ minds with the public policy. If 
we find evidence for this relationship, it will be a radical change in scholars’ 
understanding of how political values operate in influencing policy prefer-
ences. 
Second, we take these models out of the domain of the purely cognitive 
to consider affect. We predict that life events that evoke self-interest and
group interest also will generate emotions that influence vested interest and 
policy preferences. 
Third, we test the causal direction of two key sets of variables—vested
interest and political values. Scholars to date have rejected the possibility
that political values, which are considered long-enduring predispositions,
can be affected by self-interest (Sears and Funk 1991), but we argue here for 
a chance to test this assumption. We accept that symbolic and abstract be-
liefs serve as stable guiding principles, but we seek to tell a more complete
story that involves conditions under which people may adjust their beliefs in
response to life circumstances. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The theoretical model is displayed in Figure 1. We view the ante-
cedents of self-interest as the beginning of the causal chain in the model.
The point of the study is to understand how people’s changing life circum-
stances prompt them to perceive that certain public policies are in their self-
interest, thus causing them to hold a vested interest. These situations stimu-
late affect, which we predict mediates between the antecedents of self-
interest and vested interest. Taken broadly, different types of antecedents of 
self-interest will stimulate different emotions. 
We believe that situations that lead to someone not being able to pay 
his or her medical bills will cause anxiety. This hypothesis is consistent with
the work of Ortony et al. (1988), who considered anxiety to be a “fear emo-
tion” that results when one is displeased about the prospect of an undesirable
event. Certainly, not being able to pay medical bills would lead to deep
dread, as one’s health care can be denied, and many even have to file for 
bankruptcy after not being able to pay resulting debts. Thus we predict that: 
Hypothesis 1: Antecedents of self-interest increase anxiety about
paying for health care. 
Broadly speaking, anxiety has several effects, mainly causing greater 
processing of information and learning. Political scientists find this effect
in political campaigns (Marcus et al. 2000; MacKuen et al. 2007), when 
people search the Internet during political campaigns (Valentino et al. 2008;
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
6 | Gregory A. Petrow and Timothy Vercellotti 
Figure 1. Theoretical Model of Vested Interest and Policy Support
Antecedents of 
Self-Interest 
Vested 
Interest 
Political 
Value 
Policy 
Attitude 
Affect 
Valentino et al. 2009), and to a limited extent during the run-up to the War 
in Iraq (Huddy et al. 2007). However, the role of anxiety is clearly, to some
extent, contextual. People anxious about a presidential candidate are more 
interested in the campaign, but only those people high in internal efficacy
(Rudolph et al. 2000). Anxiety may only promote learning if people believe
they can overcome the threats they face (Nadeau et al. 1995). Too much 
anxiety can limit processing, and learning, because people engage in
avoidance behaviors (LeDoux 1996; Panskepp 1998). After people have
chosen a candidate in an election, anxiety about that candidate only leads to
more learning when people discover unsetting information about the person,
and then the learning only occurs about that candidate (Redlawsk et al.
2007). In the aftermath of 9/11, the anxious did not learn more about the
situation compared to the non-anxious, nor did they in the run-up to the War
in Iraq (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Huddy et al. 2007). 
Despite these limitations to the role of anxiety, there is still clearly a
general relationship between greater anxiety and more information process-
ing.4 However, even more important for this project is the finding that in-
creased information-seeking displaces the dominant role usually played by
people’s long-standing symbolic predispositions, such as partisanship or
ideological identification (Marcus et al. 2000; MacKuen et al. 2007). 
The consequence of the greater processing is that people become
thoughtful regarding the threat they face. They come to focus on the threat. 
The result is that people will give thought to solutions to their problems, and
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
How Our Life Experiences Affect Our Politics  | 7 
in the process, they are more likely to see a national health care program as a
political solution. This would be the result because some will come to see
that the policy will benefit them. These cognitive effects lead us to predict
that anxiety will cause people to perceive they have a vested interest in the
public policy. This is a result of anxiety prompting individuals to pay closer
attention to relevant information, which then informs their views, as well as 
softens their commitment to their predispositions. We expect that: 
Hypothesis 2: Anxiety increases vested interest concerning health
care. 
The Role of Political Values
Turning to the theoretical model as displayed in Figure 1, the vested 
interest may then affect the political value by prompting individuals to align
their value to be consistent with their vested interest. This is a position at
odds with what we call the “consensus view” of political values. Scholars 
with this view argue that values are learned through an uncritical socializa-
tion process in childhood, and that values are guiding principles that shape
subordinate attitudes, but not vice-versa (e.g., Sears and Funk 1999, Feld-
man and Steenbergen 2001). A core claim of the “consensus view” is that 
self-interest never affects values (Sears and Funk 1991; see also Eagly and
Chaiken 1998). 
However, an alternative view is that values often are truisms with little
cognitive support. They are composed of affect and behavioral associations
(that is, value-consistent behaviors). Thus, if life circumstances are suffi-
ciently powerful, people may reexamine their limited cognitive support for 
values and thus change their values (Maio and Olson 1998; Bernard et al. 
2003). Scholars have shown that values only affect choices and behaviors 
when they are cognitively activated and central to one’s self-concept (Ver-
planken and Hollard 2002). McCann (1997) argues that values are not more 
stable than other attitudes. Furthermore, Boninger et al. (1995) find that self-
interest causes people to think of their political values, and Baron and
Leshner (2000) find that protected values are amenable to change when 
challenged. Some of the most recent work on the malleability of political
values finds that partisanship affects the political values people endorse, but
not vice-versa (Goren 2005). 
A consideration of the cognition of attitudes reveals how these values
might, in fact, be changed when individuals consider their self-interest. One 
way that values and self-interest can become associated is if they are em-
bedded attitudes in an associative network. Attitude embeddedness is the
degree to which attitudes are associated with other attitudes (Prisline and
  
  
 
 
 
    
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
     
   
  
8 | Gregory A. Petrow and Timothy Vercellotti 
Ouellette 1996). For those in the American electorate struggling with health 
care costs, we may expect that their values, self interest and support for 
national health insurance are embedded with one another because highly
embedded attitudes are associated with the experience one has with an atti-
tude object and with attitude-related knowledge (Prisline and Ouellette
1996). For those facing major medical bills, the personal benefit to them of 
national health insurance may become apparent. Because their political
values are embedded in the same cognitive structures as policy preferences,
they would align their relevant values (for which they have little cognitive
support) to maintain cognitive consistency with their policy preference
(Eagly and Chaiken 1998).5 
We believe two core political values may be important for evaluating a 
national health insurance plan: that of active government, and egalitarianism.
Active government is the degree to which people value a government that 
intervenes in the affairs of society (Markus 1990). In the context of access to
health care, creating a national health insurance program would involve a
dramatic expansion of the government’s role. The value of egalitarianism is 
the degree to which one values equality of outcome, which involves elim-
inating societal inequalities with government intervention in the economic
marketplace (e.g., Feldman 1987; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001). Creating
a national health insurance program is a government action that would
increase equality, and is likely to draw support from those also embrace
egalitarianism. 
Turning to the relationship between vested interest and values, we
predict:
Hypothesis 3: Vested interest in the national health insurance
condition increases the political values of active government and
egalitarianism. 
Furthermore, we expect that valuing active government and egalitar-
ianism will cause support for a national health insurance program. This is
because values and preferences are embedded in a hierarchical attitude 
structure whereby values cause policy preferences, and this holds for all
types of people. It is inherent to human cognition that people use broad 
general principles to guide their decisions and actions.6 This leads to our
understanding that in politics, people’s preferences are generally consistent
with their political values. And as we argue here, values are not frozen in
place after adolescence, but change according to experience and new infor-
mation. We expect that valuing active government, and equality in particu-
lar, should increase support for a national health insurance program because
values are powerful determinants of peoples’ policy preferences, and being 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
How Our Life Experiences Affect Our Politics  | 9 
predisposed toward government intervention and equality are congruent with 
programs that expand such government activism and promote equality (e.g.,
Feldman 1988). Hence, we predict: 
Hypothesis 4: Active government and egalitarianism increase 
support for national health insurance. 
Our final hypothesis is that vested interest increases support for a
national health insurance program. Vested interest is said to exist when five
criteria are satisfied: an actor perceives a stake in a given attitude object, the
object is salient to the actor, the actor believes certain specific consequences
ensue from an attitude-relevant action, the consequences are immediate, and 
the actor believes that his or her action can affect the attitude-implicated 
behavior (actor’s self-efficacy; Crano 1995). In other words, vested interest
requires that the attitude object be relevant to an individual’s well-being and
of perceived importance in terms of consequences (Lehman and Crano
2002). Such attitudes should be powerful for several reasons. Issues that are
both personally relevant and that have perceived important consequences 
should prompt people to pay closer attention to the details of arguments 
regarding the issue. That heightened attention should result in greater 
thought about the topic and greater openness to being persuaded (Petty and
Cacioppo 1986). 
Hypothesis 5: Vested interest increases support for a national
health insurance program. 
Data and Methodology 
We test our hypotheses using data from a random-digit-dial statewide
telephone survey in North Carolina conducted April 18-26, 2005. The
sample used in this research consists of interviews with 748 adults ages 18
and older. We weighted the data to reflect the distribution of the popula-
tion of adults ages 18 and older in North Carolina based on gender, race,
Hispanic/non-Hispanic, and age. Further details about the demographic 
composition of the sample, both weighted and unweighted, can be found in
Appendix A.
The key endogenous variables for the model are: 
Support for a national health care plan: “Would you support or oppose
the creation of a government insurance plan that covers all medical and 
hospital costs for all citizens?” (5-point scale, with 1 = strongly oppose it
and 5 = strongly support it.)
 
 
 
  
  
  
   
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 | Gregory A. Petrow and Timothy Vercellotti 
Political value of active government: An additive scale (alpha = 0.72) 
combining responses to three questions about active government. (Full text
of the questions is found in Appendix B.) 
Political value of egalitarianism: Do you agree or disagree with the
following statement: “All in all, I think economic differences in this country
are justified.” (5-point scale, with 1 = strongly agree and 5 = strongly dis-
agree.) 
Vested interest: “Thinking about you personally and your life as it is, if 
the government set up a national health insurance plan, would the conse-
quences for you, in general, be very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat
negative, very negative, or would there be no consequences for you per-
sonally?” (5-point scale, with 1 = very negative and 5 = very positive.)
The model contains measures of the antecedents of self-interest, such as 
needing help paying medical bills; a prospective view of the health of the
national economy in the coming year; and a measure of affect in the form of 
concern about being able to pay medical bills. The model also controls for
political ideology, political party registration, gender, whether the respon-
dent is African-American, education, annual household income, and the
respondent’s age. The model includes a squared age term to control for pos-
sible curvilinear effects of age. The very young and the elderly might be less
supportive of national health care for different reasons. Young people tend
to be healthier and in less need of medical care, and individuals ages 65 and
older already are covered by Medicare. 
We tested our hypotheses using Three-Stage Least Squares regression. 
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, the only way to test for relation-
ships between vested interest and political values is to allow each variable to
affect the other. The resulting model is non-recursive, and using Ordinary
Least Squares in the analysis is ill-advised. When we place the equations for 
vested interest and political values in reduced form, the independent vari-
ables in the equations are correlated with the error terms, leading to esti-
mates that are biased and inconsistent (Berry 1984). The typical approach to
analyzing non-recursive models is to use Two-Stage Least Squares, in which 
estimates for the reduced form equation are calculated in the first stage. The 
estimates for the dependent variables in question are then used to create
instrumental predictors in the second stage that are not correlated with the
error terms for the equations. Three-Stage Least Squares takes the model one
step further by estimating all of the equations in the model simultaneously, 
which controls for the possibility that error terms for all or some of the equa-
tions in the model might be correlated with each other (Berry 1984; Godwin
1985). This is a more cautious approach to control for possible correlated
error terms across the equations, and it presents two advantages. The models’ 
estimates have smaller variances, making them more efficient than those in 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
How Our Life Experiences Affect Our Politics  | 11 
Two-Stage Least Squares (Godwin 1985). The model also produces a 
system-weighted R-squared statistic for the entire model. We can thus 
measure the explained variance for all of the endogenous variables in the 
model and compare the model fit between different nested models. Two-
Stage Least Squares generates R-squared statistics for the individual equa-
tions in the model, but those statistics are not meaningful for the non-
recursive equations given the feedback going on between the equations.
The disadvantage of using the Three-Stage Least Squares method is
that it is a “full information” estimator, and thus carries with it the assump-
tion that the model is properly specified. If specification errors seep into any
of the model’s equations, the error affects the estimations in all of the
model’s equations (Berry 1984; Godwin 1985). We believe our model is
properly specified, based on our theory and previous findings from the 
literature. We also conducted diagnostic tests of the model to confirm that
the model is well-specified, and that our identification and exclusion restric-
tion assumptions are valid. We find this to be the case, and we report results 
in Appendix C. 
We report our results using fully standardized coefficients, meaning the 
coefficients are in the metric of standard deviations. This allows us to com-
pare the direct effects of vested interest and political values on each other
despite the varying scales for the measures. Using fully standardized esti-
mates also allows us to calculate direct and indirect effects for the models. 
Results 
Reporting Apparent Effects 
We report the results for four models. The first two models are the 
fully-specified vested interest models, with measures of the antecedents of 
self-interest, vested interest, political values, and anxiety. The first model
includes egalitarianism as the political value, and the second includes active
government. The final two models are meant to represent the kinds of
models political scientists traditionally estimate to ascertain the effects of
“self-interest”—these include measures of the antecedents of self-interest to
stand for self-interest, but excluding vested interest. We will contrast the two 
different stories these types of models tell. We present the results for Model
1, including vested interest, and egalitarianism, in Table 1. 
e find that all four of the antecedents of self-interest increase people’s 
worry over being able to pay their health care bills (p < .01 for all
four results). The other factor that increases worry is age (p < .01), although 
age-squared and income both decrease worry (p < .01). The age-squared 
result indicates that advancing into the oldest ages decreases worry, probably
  
 
   
   
 
 
   
 
 
    
  
   
    
   
 
  
 
  
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
 
   
  
 
  
 
12 | Gregory A. Petrow and Timothy Vercellotti 
Table 1. The Vested Interest Model of Policy Support
with Egalitarianism 
Vested National 
Variables Worry Interest Egalitarianism Health Plan 
No health coverage .10** .01 .09* 
Difficult to pay medical bills .29** 
Delayed a major purchase .14** 
Prospective personal finance .15** 
Prospective national economy .05 
Worry .20* -.31* 
Egalitarianism  .62** .54** 
Vested interest .78** .90** 
Ideology .05 .06
Party registration .11** -.13** 
Education -.10** -.04+ .06 
Age 
Age2
1.26**
-1.20**
-.03
-.05 
.03 
Income -.15** -.16** .13+ 
African-American .05 -.14** .17** 
Woman .05 -.05 .06 
Intercept -.45 2.02** -.50 -1.84** 
**p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10 (two-tailed tests). Results are standardized estimates using Three-Stage 
Least Squares regression. Degrees of freedom = 2950, System-weighted R2 = .265.
because these people qualify for Medicare. Education and income (both at
p < .01) predict less worry over health care expenses. 
The aforementioned heightened worry, in turn, predicts higher values
of vested interest (p < .05), as does egalitarianism (p < .01).7 African-Ameri-
cans perceive vested interest at lower levels (p < .01), with income (p < .01) 
and education (p < .10) also predicting lower levels of vested interest. The
vested interest, in turn, predicts higher levels of egalitarianism (p < .01). 
Party registration (p < .01), income (p < .10) and African-American (p < .01) 
do as well. 
We tested for the presence of a causal feedback path from egalitarian-
ism to vested interest, and we do find a statistically significant feedback path
(p < .01).8 However, we note that the standardized coefficients allow us to
compare the magnitudes of the effects, and that vested interest has a bit of a
larger effect on egalitarianism that egalitarianism has on vested interest.9 
Finally, we find five direct effects on support for a national health
insurance plan. The standardized effects allow us to compare the magnitudes
of the effects. The largest effect is for vested interest (B = .90, p < .01). The
next largest is for egalitarianism (B = .54, p < .01). The third largest is for 
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worry (B = -.31, p < .05). The next largest effect is for party registration
(B = -.13, p < .01), and the smallest statistically significant effect is for not
having health insurance (B = .09, p < .05).10 We note two surprising results
here: worry decreases support for a national health plan, as does party regis-
tration (with Democrats coded as the high value). This suggests that once
spurious and intervening factors are controlled for, these factors actually 
have negative effects. We note, however, that in the case of worry, the total
effects are quite small in both the vested interest models.
Importantly, while the antecedent of self-interest has a small direct
effect upon the policy preference, the psychological manifestation of that 
belief in the form of vested interest has a direct and powerful effect. Indeed,
the standardized effect coefficient allows one to compare the magnitude of
the effect to others, and it is one of the largest in the model. A one-unit in-
crease in vested interest leads to a .90 standard deviation increase in support
for a national health insurance program. 
In Table 2 we report the results for Model 2, which includes vested
interest with the active government political value.
Table 2. The Vested Interest Model of Policy Support
with Active Government 
Vested Active National 
Variables Worry Interest Government Health Plan 
No health coverage .10** .01 .10** 
Difficult to pay medical bills .29** 
Delayed a major purchase .14** 
Prospective personal finance .14** 
Prospective national economy .05 
Worry .27* -.12 
Active Government .55** .39** 
Vested interest .61** .60** 
Ideology .12** .05 
Party registration .07* -.01 
Education -.10** -.04 .03 
Age 
Age2
1.26**
-1.20**
.05
-.03 
-.13** 
Income -.15** -.09* -.05 
African-American .05 -.08* .12** 
Woman .05 -.08* .11** 
Intercept -.41 1.28** 2.81* -.65 
**p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10 (two-tailed tests). Results are standardized estimates using Three-Stage 
Least Squares regression. Degrees of freedom = 2950, System-weighted R2 = .260.
  
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
    
14 | Gregory A. Petrow and Timothy Vercellotti 
The same pattern of results that we report in Table 1 holds here. The ante-
cedents of self-interest increase people’s anxiety regarding their health 
expenses (p < .01 for all results). Age also increases such anxiety (p < .01), 
although age-squared decreases it (p < .01). People with more education and
income are also less worried about such expenses (p < .01). 
The antecedents increase anxiety, which in turn increases peoples’ 
sense that a national health care program is in their self-interest (p < .05). 
The other factor that increases such a sense of self-interest is the political
value of active government (p < .01). The factors that decrease vested inter-
est are income, and being female or African-American (all at p < .05). 
Vested interest then goes on to increase valuing active government
(p < .01). As with the value of egalitarianism, we find that there is a causal
feedback here between vested interest and the political value. However, as
before, the relationship from vested interest to the value is slightly stronger 
than the reverse. Ideology and party registration also increase valuing active
government (p < .01 and p < .05, respectively), as does being female and
African-American (both p < .01). Older people tend to value it less (p < .01). 
We turn now to the results for the direct effects upon support for a
national health care program. We find three statistically significant results.
The largest is for vested interest (B = .60, p < .01). The next largest is for
active government (B = .39, p < .01). The final statistically significant effect
is for not having health insurance (B = .10, p < .01). 
We conclude reporting results with Tables 3 and 4: models that drop
vested interest. In Table 3 we report the results including egalitarianism, and
in Table 4 we report results including active government. 
In Table 3 we find that the antecedents of self-interest continue to be predic-
tors of worry (p < .01). Age predicts higher levels of worry as well (p < .01).
Education leads to less worry, as do age-squared and income (all at p < .01). 
Ideology and party registration lead to higher levels of egalitarianism, 
and African-Americans and women endorse higher levels of the political
value as well (p < .01 for all, but women p < .10). People with higher in-
comes endorse egalitarianism at lower levels (p < .01). 
In this model, we find that various factors directly affect support for 
national health insurance. Not having health insurance predicts greater sup-
port (B = .14, p < .01). Egalitarianism is the most powerful predictor of sup-
port (B = .73, p < .01). Health-related anxiety (B = .16, p < .10) and ideol-
ogy (B = .12, p < .01) predict support as well. Party registration predicts
opposition (B = -.13, p < .05). 
In Table 4 we report results for the models including active government 
but lacking vested interest. The pattern of results is the same as before. The
antecedents increase levels of worry, as does age (p < .01). Education
decreases  worry,  as do age-squared and income  (p < .01). Ideology,  party
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Table 3. The Basic Self-Interest Model with Egalitarianism: 
No Vested Interest 
National 
Variables Worry Egalitarianism Health Plan 
No health coverage 
Difficult to pay medical bills 
Delayed a major purchase 
Prospective personal finance 
Prospective national economy
Worry
Egalitarianism  
Ideology
Party registration 
Education
.10**
.28**
.14**
.16**
.03
-.10**
.02
.10**
.23**
.00
.14** 
.16+ 
.73** 
.12** 
-.13* 
Age
Age2
Income 
1.25**
-1.20**
-.16**
-.04
-.10**
African-American .05 .14**
Woman .05 .06+ 
Intercept -.30 3.12** -.10 
**p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10 (two-tailed tests). Results are standardized estimates using Three-Stage 
Least Squares regression. Degrees of freedom = 2214, System-weighted R2 = .228.
Table 4. The Basic Self-Interest Model with Active Government: 
No Vested Interest 
Active National 
Variables Worry Government Health Plan 
No health coverage 
Difficult to pay medical bills 
Delayed a major purchase 
Prospective personal finance 
Prospective national economy
Worry
Active Government 
Ideology
Party registration 
Education
Age
Age2
Income 
African-American 
Woman
Intercept 
.10**
.28**
.14**
.16**
.03
-.10**
1.25**
-1.21**
-.16**
.05
.05
-.45
.02
.19**
.12**
-.02
-.14**
-.20**
.12**
.11**
7.73**
.12** 
.14+ 
.61** 
.06 
-.02 
.22 
**p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10 (two-tailed tests). Results are standardized estimates using Three-Stage 
Least Squares regression. Degrees of freedom = 2214, System-weighted R2 = .238.
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registration, African-American and female lead to greater endorsement of 
active government (p < .01). Age and income lead to opposition (p < .01). 
Finally, active government leads people to support a national health care
program (B = .61, p < .01), as does health-expense related anxiety (B = .14,
p < .10) and not having health insurance (B = .12, p < .01). 
A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 with 3 and 4 suggests that including
vested interest alters the apparent role of self-interest in guiding people’s
policy preferences. A simple way to evaluate this is to look at the direct
effects. Without vested interest, the largest direct effects on support for a
national health insurance program are the political values egalitarianism and 
active government. However, with vested interest, these values play less of a 
role and are supplanted by the larger effects of vested interest. We will make 
this case more clearly by considering how including vested interest affects 
measures of model fit, as well as considering the direct and indirect effects 
from our path models to compare the total effect of vested interest to the 
total effect of the symbolic politics variables. 
Reporting Changes in Model Fit 
How important is the concept of vested interest to support for a national
health care program? One can compare the measures of model fit from the 
first two models that include vested interest, to the last two to that do not, to
ascertain the cost in model fit of excluding vested interest. The first two
models have system R-squared statistics of .265 and .260, for the models
with egalitarianism and active government, respectively. The second two 
models, lacking vested interest, have system R-squared statistics of .228 and
.238, again with egalitarianism and active government, respectively. In other 
words, for the models with egalitarianism, dropping vested interest decreases
the percent of the variance explained by the independent variables by 3.7 
percent, and for the models with active government, the drop is 2.2 percent. 
These differences are statistically significant at the p < .01 level, using an
F-test. 
Taking this type of analysis one step further, a common approach in the 
symbolic politics literature is to compare measures of model fit for models 
that include only the symbolic politics measures to those that contain only
the measures of self-interest (e.g., Lau and Heldman 2009). Typically, the 
symbolic politics variables explain substantially more of the variance in
policy support than the self-interest variables do. We conduct our own statis-
tical exercise of this type to see if including vested interest might produce a
different outcome. 
We estimate a 3SLS model without any measures of self-interest, but 
including all of the other variables, as well as the measures of symbolic 
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politics (results not reported). For the models with egalitarianism we find an
R-squared of .182, and for active government an R-squared of .218. We then 
estimate a model with all of our measures of self-interest (vested interest and
the antecedents of self-interest), and all of the other variables, but none of
the symbolic variables, and find an R-squared of .215. One cannot compute
a difference in fit statistic because these models are not nested in one 
another. However, the self-interest model explains 3.3 percent more of the
total variance of the endogenous variables than the egalitarian value model,
while the measure of model fit for the self-interest model, compared to the 
active government model, is practically identical. Including vested interest 
among predictors of policy preference, then, produces models that fit as well
as, if not better than, models employing only symbolic variables. 
Considering Direct Effects and Indirect Effects 
We presented some preliminary evidence that including vested interest
as a measure of self-interest alters one’s conclusion about the importance of
the role of self-interest. With a path model such as ours, however, one
cannot truly assess the total magnitudes of the effects of the independent
variables without partitioning the effects into direct and indirect. We engage 
in this exercise now to demonstrate the importance of vested interest to
making self-interest a concept that can compete viably with the variables of
symbolic politics. 
To begin the comparison of the effects of vested interest versus the 
antecedents of self-interest, we analyze the results for Tables 3 and 4, in 
which vested interest is not included, to decompose the direct and indirect
effects. We consider this to represent the standard treatment of self-interest, 
and we engage in this exercise to show how excluding vested interest does
reproduce the standard middling effects of self-interest one finds in the
literature. We decompose the total effects into direct and indirect effects in
Table 5. 
We start with the model from Tables 3 and 4, with egalitarianism and
active government. The largest total effects are for the political values 
egalitarianism (B = .73) and active government (B = .61). We sum up all of 
the total effects of the antecedents of self-interest, and all of the total effects 
of the symbolic politics variables. Consistent with previous findings, the size 
of the effect of all of the symbolic politics variables is three times larger than
the self-interest effects when egalitarianism is in the model, and four times 
larger when active government is in the model. One would conclude that
while self-interest seems to matter, its effect is clearly dwarfed by the
variables of symbolic politics. 
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Table 5. Direct and Indirect Effects on Support 
for a National Health Care Program 
Table 3
(Basic self-interest model
with egalitarianism as a 
political value)
Table 4 
(Basic self-interest model 
with active government 
as a political value) 
Direct Indirect* Total Direct Indirect* Total 
No health coverage .14 .02 .16 .12 .01 .13 
Difficult medical bills N/A .04 .04 N/A .04 .04 
Delaying a major purchase N/A .02 .02 N/A .02 .02 
Prospective personal finance N/A .03 .03 N/A .02 .02 
Sum of self-interest 
antecedents .14 .11 .25 .12 .09 .21 
Political value .73 N/A .73 .61 N/A .61 
Ideology .12 .07 .12 N.S. .12 .12
Party registration -.13 -.03 -.16 N.S. .07 .07 
Sum of symbolic variables .72 .04 .76 .62 .19 .81 
Worry .25 N/A .25 .14 N/A .14 
*Indirect effects for the antecedents of self-interest are through worry. Indirect effects of worry are
through the political value. Indirect effects of ideology and party registration are through the politi-
cal value. 
However, bringing vested interest into the equations alters this conclu-
sion. We decompose the total effects for all of the theoretically-important 
variables from Tables 1 and 2 in Table 6.  
The variable with the largest total effect from both tables is vested
interest (B = 1.10 with egalitarianism and B = .68 with active government).
Adding together all of the direct effects of the self-interest variables, and 
comparing that to the total effect of all of the symbolic politics variables
reveals the total effect of self-interest to be larger. Comparing the total 
effects, one concludes that while the self-interest variables appear to be a bit
more important, both sets of variables are roughly equal in magnitude.
Discussion 
Reviewing Hypotheses 
We begin discussing these results by reviewing how well the hypoth-
eses fared in light of the statistical tests. The first hypothesis is that the
antecedents of self-interest increase health expense-related anxiety, and the
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Table 6. Direct and Indirect Effects on Support 
for a National Health Care Program 
Table 1 Table 2 
(With egalitarianism (With active government 
as a political value as a political value and 
and vested interest) vested interest) 
Direct Indirect* Total Direct Indirect* Total 
No health coverage .10 -.01 .09 .10 .01 .11 
Difficult medical bills N/A -.04 -.04 N/A .02 .02 
Delaying a major purchase N/A -.01 -.01 N/A .00 .00 
Prospective personal finance N/A -.02 -.02 N/A .00 .00 
Sum of antecedents .10 -.08 .02 .10 .03 .13 
Vested interest .90 .20 1.10 .60 .08 .68 
Sum of self-interest 1.00 .12 1.12 .70 .11 .81 
Political value .54 .53 1.07 .39 .24 .63 
Ideology N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. .07 .07 
Party registration -.13 .09 -.04 N.S. .04 .04 
Sum of symbolic variables
Worry
.41
-.31
.62
.22
1.03
-.09
.39
-.12
.35
.18
.74 
.06 
*Indirect effects for the antecedents of self-interest are through worry and vested interest. Indirect
effects of worry are through vested interest and the political value. Indirect effects of vested interest
are through the political value. Indirect effects of the political value are through vested interest. In-
direct effects of ideology and party registration are through the political value and vested interest. 
evidence strongly supports this hypothesis. In all four of the models, every 
antecedent of self-interest increases anxiety at the p < .01 level. The second 
hypothesis is that this health expense anxiety increases vested interest, and 
this hypothesis is strongly supported as well—in both models with vested
interest, worry increases vested interest at the p < .01 level. The third 
hypothesis is that vested interest increases support for the political values of
egalitarianism and active government. Our results support this hypothesis.
However, we also find a strong reciprocal relationship, with egalitarianism
and active government affecting vested interest as well. Our fourth hypoth-
esis is that the political values increase support for a national health insur-
ance program. We find that this is the case, with both active government and 
egalitarianism increasing support for a national health program at the p < .01 
level. Finally, we hypothesize that vested interest increases support for a 
national health insurance program. This hypothesis is strongly supported, as
vested interest increases support for the program in each of the two models,
and the effects are among the largest in the models. 
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Reconsidering a Role for Self-Interest 
Our models confirm our hypotheses, and the strongest confirmation
comes for the role of self-interest in affecting people’s support for a national 
health care program. As we noted earlier, the models without vested interest 
suggest an important but not dominant role for self-interest in shaping these
policy preferences. However, once we include vested interest in the model,
the total effects of self-interest are among the largest in the model, and they
are larger than the total effects of the symbolic politics variables. In addition, 
the models with the vested interest enjoy better fits with the data than the
models without. When including vested interest, the self-interest models fit
the data better than, or as well as, the symbolic politics-only models. 
These results demand that scholars not close the book on the role of 
self-interest. Past findings that the role of self-interest is limited are based on
studies in which self-interest is not allowed to operate as a psychological
concept that varies among individuals. Instead, people who are in certain
categories or situations are assumed, by scholars, to be self-interested. This 
approach does have certain advantages, as researchers have noted (e.g.,
Sears and Funk 1991). The antecedents of self interest are clearly exogenous
from the factors that they are believed to affect. Because of this clear
exogeneity, there is no presence of causal feedback from other attitudinal
variables of interest. Escalating health expenses are not caused by ideology,
or party, or other symbolic political attitudes. 
We, of course, define and operationalize self-interest in a different way,
finding a powerful role for it. Our definition leads to measures of it that are
not exogenous from other symbolic political attitudes. The resulting dis-
advantage to this approach is that vested interest is associated with ideo-
logical identification and some political values, and possibly other symbolic
political attitudes.11 The advantage of this approach, however, is that it is the 
superior theoretical way to approach self-interest. First, the theoretical
assumption that being in a certain group or condition automatically leads to
a self-interested attitude is faulty. Such beliefs should be shaped by indi-
viduals’ own beliefs and perceptions. Second, theory can account for what
these beliefs should be. Third, once we measure vested interest and model it
in such a way to account for the beliefs that influence how people perceive
their own self-interest, the role of vested interest is powerful. The models 
with vested interest fit better than those without it, and the size of the effect
is large. 
A second finding of this study, and a second provocative one at that, is
that political values are affected by self-interest. Some scholars of self-
interest argue that such a relationship is impossible (Sears and Funk 1991).
However, we find that the values of active government and egalitarianism
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are affected by vested interest. Of course, we do find there is also a projec-
tion effect, whereby people find the policy to be in their self-interest because
it is consistent with their political values. 
Finally, we take note of the role of affect in this model. Affect is the
catalyst that brings forth vested interest. Anxiety is probably the most suited 
emotion to do so, because it brings forth extra thought, which is necessary 
for people to abandon their predispositions (such as altering their endorse-
ment of political values). The total effect of anxiety in the vested interest
models is quite small: weakly negative with egalitarianism (B = -.09), and
weakly positive with active government (B = .06). 
Conclusion
We conclude by noting some limits to this study. First, the data we
employ is from a random sample telephone survey of residents of North
Carolina, and thus we cannot generalize our results to the entire U.S. popula-
tion. That said, theory tells us that we have no reason to believe that the rela-
tionships between the antecedents of self-interest, anxiety, vested interest,
values, and the policy preference should be any different nationally. 
A second caveat has to do with our effect estimates for vested interest. 
We find large effects for self-interest, but, as we noted, vested interest is not
exogenous from symbolic attitudes. It might be the case that some of the 
magnitude of the relationship is due to other factors not included in the
model, such as some other excluded political value. That said, however, we 
have certainly included the most important factors—active government,
egalitarianism, party registration, ideological identification, and anxiety. In 
addition, we model the causal feedback between vested interest and the
political values, thus accounting for them statistically. We contend that 
while there may be other unaccounted for factors, their impacts on the 
results should be minimal. 
A third caveat has to do with our statistical analysis of cross-sectional 
survey data. Because we do not have data over time, we have to use an
instrumental variables approach to estimate the non-recursive paths. As we 
reported earlier, tests of the instruments reveal that they are properly identi-
fied and exogenous. However, the magnitudes of the paths are partly func-
tions of the exclusion restrictions that are necessary to identify the model
given the non-recursive paths. While the tests indicate these are good 
assumptions, using other instruments, or making other exclusion restrictions,
may result in the model reporting different results. 
A fourth caveat is that our study involves only one policy preference.
While the evidence we present for self-interest influencing support for a 
national health care program is strong, it may be possible that this model 
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cannot be applied universally to all policy preferences. One possible limit on 
the generalizability of the model could have to do with the kind of affect
evoked by the policy. While anxiety has clear links with increased informa-
tion processing and the willingness to abandon predispositions, other feel-
ings, such as anger and happiness, do not (Marcus et al. 2000). This model 
may only be applicable when the policy evokes anxiety, because the anxiety 
may be necessary to increasing vested interest, or for vested interest to affect 
a political value. 
Our fifth and final caveat is that in this model we test only one dimen-
sion of the two-dimensional model from Affective Intelligence theory
(Marcus et al. 2000).12 We consider the impact of the surveillance dimension
on processing, and the policy preference, but not the impact of the disposi-
tion dimension (which is tapped by happiness). We expect that enthusiasm
or happiness leads to more heuristic processing, and thus this feeling would
not mediate between the antecedents of self-interest and the policy prefer-
ence. However, this hypothesis is untestable with our data. In addition, we
do not consider the role of anger, and any possible relationship between
anger and anxiety. 
In conclusion, and with these caveats noted, we believe that our find-
ings present a challenge to the clear consensus in the literature on the minor 
role of self-interest. We find that when conceived of as vested interest, self-
interest plays a powerful role in shaping policy preferences. We find this
when we consider the direct effect of vested interest, as well as the total 
effect. We also find that self-interest leads people to align their political
values to be consistent with perceived self interest, thus increasing support
for the relevant policy. Dropping vested interest from these models of policy
support reduces how well the models fit the data. Finally, comparing the
model fit of the self-interest models to the symbolic politics models reveals
that the self-interest models fit the data at least as well as, if not better than,
the symbolic politics-only models. 
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Appendix A. Demographic Composition of Sample
Characteristics of North Carolina Survey Respondents 
Weighted Unweighted Unweighted 
Data Data N 
Gender Male 48% 39% 293 
Female 52% 61% 455 
Race White 73% 80% 597 
Black 20% 14% 103 
Hispanic 4% 2% 14 
Asian 1% 1% 5 
 Native American 1% 2% 12 
Other 1% 2% 15 
Age 18-24 13% 5% 34 
25-34 20% 16% 118 
35-44 22% 19% 139 
45-54 18% 23% 170 
55-64 12% 20% 150 
65 and up 16% 18% 137 
Education High school or less 24% 20% 153 
 Some college 37% 38% 284 
 College graduate 39% 42% 311 
Household Less than $10,000 6% 4% 33 
Income $10,000 to under $25,000 14% 13% 98 
$25,000 to under $50,000 27% 25% 187 
$50,000 to under $75,000 27% 28% 209 
$75,000 to under $100,000 13% 15% 111 
$100,000 or more 14% 15% 110 
Total N 748 
Appendix B. Measures 
The data used in this research come from a random-digit-dial statewide telephone survey
in North Carolina conducted April 18-26, 2005. The sample consists of interviews with 
748 adults ages 18 and older. The survey contained the following measures: 
Political value of active government: An additive scale (alpha = 0.72) combining the
following questions. 
1. Next, I am going to read two statements. Please tell me which statement is closer to 
your view: The less government, the better; or, there are more things the government 
should be doing. 
2. Please tell me which statement is closer to your view: The government should try to 
ensure that all Americans have such things as jobs, health care, and housing; or, the 
government should not be involved in this. 
. . . Appendix B continues
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Appendix B (continued) 
3. Please tell me which statement is closer to your view: We need a strong government to 
handle today’s economic problems; or, the free market can handle these problems 
without the government getting involved. 
(Each of the three active government questions was re-coded so that respondents choos-
ing the less active government statement were coded as 1, those saying they didn’t know 
were coded as 2, and those choosing the more active government statement were coded
as 3. Combining the three variables created a seven-point scale.) 
Antecedents of self interest (four measures): 
1. “Are you currently covered by any type of health insurance plan, including private
plans, Medicaid, or Medicare?” (0 = yes and 1 = no)  
2. “For various reasons, some people have difficulty paying their medical bills, while 
others are able to pay those expenses. In the past six months, have you had to take extra 
steps, such as borrowing money or using money from a savings account, to help pay
medical bills?” (0 = no and 1 = yes) 
3. In the past six months, have you had to do any of the following? Delay buying a large 
item, such as a major appliance or car. (0 = no/don’t know/no response, 1 = yes) 
4. Do you expect your personal financial position to get better, get worse or stay about 
the same within the next year? (1 = get better, 2 = stay about the same, 3 = get worse) 
Prospective national economic outlook:
Do you expect our national economy to get better, get worse, or stay about the same with-
in the next year? (1 = get better, 2 = stay about the same, 3 = get worse) 
Affect: “Are you concerned about being able to pay medical bills for you and your 
family? Which statement best describes your feelings about paying medical bills?” There 
were four response categories, ranging from, “I am not worried” to “I am very worried.” 
We recoded “don’t know” responses to place them at the midpoint of a five-point scale. 
Ideology: We measured political ideology using a seven-point scale ranging from 1 = 
extremely conservative to 7 = extremely liberal. 
Partisanship: Measure of political party registration, with -1 = Republican, 1 = Democrat,
0 = all others.  
Age: 2005—year of birth. 
Age squared: Squared term to measure curvilinear effects of age. 
Education: Highest level of education with 1 = some high school (or less), 2 = high 
school graduate, 3 = some college, but no college degree, 4 = associate degree, 5 = bach-
elor’s degree, 6 = some graduate school, but no graduate degree, 7 = graduate school 
degree (includes master’s, Ph.D., law or medical).
Income: Annual household income, with 1 = Less than $10,000, 2 = $10,000 to under
$25,000, 3 = $25,000 to under $50,000, 4 = $50,000 to under $75,000, 5 = $75,000 to 
under $100,000, 6 = $100,000 or more. 
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Appendix C. Assessing the Three Stage Least Square Model’s Assumptions 
Three Stage Least Squares: Vested Interest Model of Policy Support 
Vested Interest Active 
 Vested Interest Egalitar- (Active Govern-
 (Egalitarianism) ianism Government) ment 
[A] Under-identification Test: 
Anderson Canon. Corr. 
LM statistic (p-value) 54.4 (p<.01) 71.2 (p<.01) 78.8 (p<.01) 71.2 (p<.01) 
[B] Weak identification test: 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
F Statistic 28.9 38.7 43.4 38.7 
[C] Over-identification test of all instruments: 
Sargan Chi-Square 
Statistic (p-value) 2.1 (p=.15) 0 (p=.99) .001 (p=.98) .76 (p=.38) 
Analysis of results: 
[A] The under-identification test tests the relevance of the instruments to the endogenous 
variable. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the equation is identified and the instru-
ments (the variables that affect the endogenous variable only) are relevant. In these 
models we reject the null hypothesis, p < .01. 
[B] With the weak identification test we test whether or not the instruments are weak
instruments; in others words, that they are only weakly correlated with the endogenous
variables. Instruments are considered to be weak if the resulting F statistic is less than 10 
(Staiger and Stock 1997). All of the statistics here are greater than 10. 
[C] The over-identification test checks whether or not the instruments are correlated with
the equations’ error terms. If they are correlated, the parameters are biased. The null
hypothesis is that they are not correlated, and that the exclusion restrictions are correct.
We accept the null hypothesis for all equations, p > .10. 
NOTES 
1In the vote choice literature specifically, the originally minimal role found for 
pocketbook voting is giving way to a more nuanced understanding of when voters do, 
and do not, use their own personal economic conditions to make their vote choices.
Originally, scholars concluded that voters voted based on sociotropic, and not pocket-
book, economic reasoning (e.g., Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Kiewiet 1983; Sigelman et al. 
1991). Some scholars found that both mattered, although sociotopic factors mattered 
more (Markus 1988). However, more recent scholarship finds a role for pocketbook
voting (in Congressional elections or evaluations, Romero and Stambough 1996; 
Rudolph 2002; or, in Presidential elections, Grafstein 2005; Gomez and Wilson 2001). 
2Recent work suggests a reason for these results is because people use their notions
of self-interest to make decisions about things that will affect them immediately, while 
using symbolic considerations to make decisions about issues that occur more distantly in 
the future (Hunt et al. 2010). 
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3This concept of vested interest requires that scholars measure individuals’ percep-
tions of their own self-interest. Such measures are absent from most data. Even when
measures of vested interest are missing, however, the antecedents of self-interest clearly 
moderate the effect of symbolic attitudes. As a debate in the literature between William
Crano and David Sears reveals, as well as later work by Lehman and Crano, symbolic 
attitudes have more effects on policy preferences among those whose self-interest is high
(for the debate, see Crano 1997a, 1997b, and Sears 1997; see also Lehman and Crano 
2002).
4For a neurochemical explanation, see Jeffrey Alan Gray (1987). 
5This suggests that the directions of the causal relationships may not be entirely
clear-cut. Indeed, such complications are a major reason that the antecedents approach to
self-interest dominates the literature, because the alternative we propose is messy. How-
ever, we contend that it is the empirically more accurate way to see self-interest. 
6For evidence of this in the political realm, see Barnea and Schwartz (1998), 
Caprara et al. (2006), Feldman (1988), Feldman and Steenbergen (2001), and Goren 
(2005).
7There were only two “don’t know” responses to the measure of affect. At the 
suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we re-ran the analyses omitting the “don’t know” 
responses from the measure of affect, and also coding “don’t know” along with “I am not 
worried” as the lowest value in the variable. Both approaches yielded results virtually 
identical to the results that we report here. Also at the suggestion of an anonymous re-
viewer, we ran analyses using a squared measure of affect to test for a curvilinear effect. 
Results using the squared term did not differ significantly from what we report here. 
8This feedback is consistent with MacCoun and Paletz (2009), who find that ideo-
logues discount research findings when they conflict with their own ideological beliefs. 
In our view, this is similar to people discounting public policies that would benefit them, 
when the policies conflict with their political values-based beliefs.
9We include one antecedent of self-interest as a predictor of vested interest: not 
having health insurance. We include this variable because it is a strong instrument for
vested interest (see Appendix B). 
10Lacking health coverage is the only antecedent of self-interest that we model as 
directly affecting support for a national health insurance plan. We exclude the others to 
help identify the model. However, in other versions of the model, we find the direct 
effects of the other antecedents to be small and typically statistically insignificant (results 
not reported). 
11Thus, we control for party identification, ideological identification, egalitarianism 
and active government in our models. 
12We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our attention. 
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